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The Collective 
Bargaining Process 
Alton W.J. Craig 
This.. paper attempts to highlight the parts of the Woods* 
Report dealing with the collective bargaining process. The 
author discusses how the goals (inputs) of labour and 
management are converted to outputs via the mechanisms 
of collective bargaining, and gives his personal opinions 
on the positions advanced in the Task Force Report. 
The Task Force ReportJ uses the ternis "collective bargaining", 
"collective bargaining system", and "collective bargaining process" loosely 
and inter-changeably, but nowhere 
does it define precisely what is meant 
by the "collective bargaining pro-
cess". For purposes, however, I de-
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1. Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour Rela-
tions, Ottawa, the Queen's Printer, 1969. This document will be referred to 
throughout this paper as the Task Force Report. 
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fine it as the mechanisms through which the parties in a collective bargaining 
system convert their goals (or inputs) into the terms and conditions of 
employment (or outputs). I hâve indicated elsewhere 2 that the collective 
bargaining process involves three seperate sets of bargaining. There is 
bargaining among the diverse goal-oriented groups and individuals within 
the union in order to reach a consensus on the demands that will be 
made. The management group goes through a similar exercise in order 
to reach a consensus on what it is prepared to offer. Walton and 
McKersie refer to thèse sets of bargaining as intra-organizational 
bargaining.3 Finally, there is bargaining between labour and management 
in order to reach accomodation on their respective proposais. 
Intra-Organizational Bargaining 
First, let me deal the intra-organizational forms of bargaining. The 
Task Force Report quite correctly points out4 that groups of employées 
with diverse goals must work out a multitude of trade-offs among them-
selves before and during negotiations. The problem of internai union 
trade-off will become ail the more acute if the Reports suggestion5 on 
union mergers should become a reality. The diversity of goals to be 
reconciled would be much greater. Difficultés hâve been experienced in 
Canada where a number of unions bargain jointly in one negotiating unit. 
For example, some of the craft unions in the pulp and paper industry in 
Eastern Canada split from the joint union group several years ago 
because they felt that wage differentials for the skilled groups were not 
being maintained. 
The Task Force Report should hâve also indicated that the manage-
ment has a séries of trade-offs to make both before and during négociations 
— trade-offs which are more difficult to make when a number of employers 
comprise the negotiating unit. The construction industry offers a prime 
example of difficulties in this area. 
2. Alton W. J. CRAIG, A Framework for Understanding lndustrial Relations Be-
haviour (A paper presented to the M.B.A. students at McMaster University, 
December 1965), p. 9. 
3. See WALTON and MCKERSIE, A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations, 
McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
4. Task Force Report, para. 295. 
5. Ibid, para. 335. 
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Bargaining Between Labour and Management 
I hâve indicate elsewhere6 that there are various mechanisms for 
converting the goals or inputs of labour and management into outputs. 
Thèse take the form of (a) day-to-day interpersonal relationships, (b) 
the structure of negotiating units and the locus of décision making, (c) 
the négociation process, (d) the grievance procédure, continuous com-
mittees, etc. and (e) various forms of government or third party inter-
vention such as conciliation, médiation, arbitration, etc. I should like 
now to discuss each of thèse briefly. 
Interpersonal Relationships 
A serious omission in the Task Force Report is a discussion of the 
day-to-day interpersonal relationships at the shop level. As numerous 
studies show, custom and informai pratices on the "shop floor,, are 
important sources of goal fulfillment for workers and supervisors. 
Gouldner and others7 show that formai contract provisions are often 
adapted by both workers and supervisors in order to accommodate the 
day-to-day needs of each other. By making concessions to workers on 
certain occasions, supervisors can expect more from them when the 
situation demands more than what is considered "normal". By receiving 
concessions, workers are often willing to offer more than normal efforts 
when required to do so. By ignoring this aspect of the employment 
relationships, the Task Force Report, in my view, has placed far too much 
emphasis on aliénation and subordination of the individual in the work 
force. 8 
The Structure of Negotiating Units 
Moving beyond the interpersonal to the inter-organization relation-
ship, we reach the structure of negotiating units through which the parties 
negotiate the terms and conditions of a collective agreement. We must be 
careful hère not to confuse the certified bargaining unit with the 
negotiating unit. In some cases they may be co-terminous, but in other 
6. Alton W. J. CRAIG, A Model for the Analysis of Industriàl Relations Systems, 
(A paper presented at the annual meeting of The Canadian Political Science 
Association, June 7, 1967). 
7. For good Canadian study on this subject, see Mr. Flood, The Local Union 
Management Relationship — A Case Study, M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 
1964. 
8. Task Force Report, paras. 300-306. 
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cases a number of certified bargaining units may constitute the negotiating 
or decision-making unit. The Task Force Report does not appear to make 
this important distinction since it seems to use the term "bargaining unit" 
to include both types. 
The Report makes several recommendations regarding the bargaining 
structure. It recommends that "where, on a voluntary basis, parties to 
différent units can settle upon a spécial common unit for particular 
purposes,... the Canada Labour Relations Board hâve discrétion to 
confirm the unit in a certificate . . . " 9 (Emphasis mine). I fail to see the 
rationale behind such a recommendation. If the parties agrée on a volu-
tary basis to a negotiating unit for particular purposes, this is tantamount 
to voluntary récognition and provides flexibility for the parties to accomo-
date major problems of mutual concern. 
It is unclear whether the suggested certificate would be issued on 
the joint request of both parties, on the initiative of the Board or both. 
If there is a rationale for this recommendation, I would be very much 
interest in learning what it is. I would also be interested in learning how 
the above recommendation fits logically into the Reporfs next recommen-
dation that the fédéral législation "be amended clearly to accomodate vo-
luntary récognition." 10 
In principle, however, I believe a serious case can be made against 
certification for spécifie purposes. Let's assume a certificate is issued for 
a pension plan or an "industrial conversion" plan, what happens after 
those plans are worked out to the satisfaction of both parties ? Should 
the same unit wish to negotiate a vacation plan, would a new certificate 
be needed ? It seems to me that implementation of this recommendation 
would introduce rigidities into labour-management relations. 
The Task Force Report also favours "the gênerai principle of freedom 
for the bargaining structure to find its own form subject to the exercise 
of influence by the state where the public interest is high. n Personnally, 
I favour the first part of this recommendation since the parties are best 
able to détermine the level of negotiating units which are most functional 
to their needs. On an informai basis this already exists in a number of 
industries, including some under fédéral jurisdiction such as East Coast 
9. Ibid, para. 453. 
10. Ibid, para. 454. 
11. Ibid, para. 550. 
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longshoring and some under provincial jurisdiction such as méat packing, 
pulp and paper, steel and auto. 
From a power point of view, however, the units that are functional 
to the needs of management may not be the same as those that are 
functional to the needs of the union. In an integrated multi-plant company, 
the union and company could be indiffèrent to the level of the negotiating 
unit from a power point of view since the closure of one plant could shut 
down the whole company. However, in terms of consistency and admini-
strative simplicity of basic policies as among plants, it may be functional 
to both parties to hâve a multi-plant negotiating unit. However, in a 
company characterized by autonomous plants where the closure of one 
does not affect the others — such as in méat packing — it is functional 
to the union's bargaining power to hâve a company-wide negotiating unit. 
The second part of the recommendation quoted above, which refers 
to the exercise of influence by the state where the public interest is high, 
gives me cause for concern. Nowhere does the Report define what consti-
tutes high public interest. If this matter is put into the hands of the Labour 
Relations Board, what criteria would the Board use to define high public 
interest? Assuming the Board could develop some kind of criteria, what 
kinds of negotiating units should it certify in such cases ? The Report 
offers no guidance in this respect, and I assume that it is because of 
the inhability of the authors — or anyone else — to specify appropriate 
criteria and the form of the negotiating unit. 
The Report quite correctly points out that « présent législation, espe-
cially in the provincial jurisdiction, tends to balkanize collective bargain-
ing, often to the advantage of a particular party of interest... » 12 The 
Report gives a very good discussion of the problems created by the 
divided jurisdiction between the fédéral and provincial levels of govern-
ment13. A good example is negotiations in the « big three » in the méat 
packing industry which hâve operated on a national negotiating unit basis 
ever since World War II. Having studied collective bargaining in that 
industry for the years 1940 to 1958 as my doctoral dissertation, I am 
very much aware of the problems created by divided jurisdiction. As long 
as the parties are able to negotiate national company-wide settlements 
without the need for conciliation, there is no problem. However, if 
12. Ibid, para. 
13. Ibid, paras 754-756. 
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direct bargaining between the parties fails to bring about agreement, 
then the conciliation stage présents serious obsbtacles. That the parties 
in the méat packing industry are wedded to national company-wide 
bargaining and are trying to make it work in spite of divided jurisdictions 
is évident from the fact that in 1966 a team from the union and Canada 
Packers jointly visited the various provincial capitals in order to obtain 
their consent to hâve conciliation proceedings under the Ontario Législa-
tion satisfy the requirements of the other provinces. In effect, the parties 
in méat packing hâve been using the Ontario conciliation proceedings 
as the effective proceedings for their national bargaining ever since 1947, 
and hâve given only pro forma adhérence to the conciliation require-
ments in the other provinces. As a resuit of this practice, the major 
recommendation in my study of that industry was that it should be 
brought under fédéral jurisdiction for collective bargaining purposes. 
The Report's14 suggestion that Section 92 (10) of the BNA Act 
might be used to bring more industries under fédéral jurisdiction is 
not as easily done as the Report suggests. A custom has grown up 
over the years that this procédure is followed only with the consent of 
the provinces. The second suggestion of federal-provincial inter-delegation 
of powers is also fraught with difficulties. Co-operation in this respect 
dépends very largely on the personalities of the political and administra-
tive personnel involved at any one moment. The influence of personalities 
as a major factor came out quite clearly in my study. Some hâve gone 
along with co-operative arrangements while others hâve opposed them. 
In a paper presented to CIRRI last year, Harry Waisglass and I suggested 
that in the présent constitutional review this subject be seriously considered 
as a constitutional matter. I personally still hold to this view, for I believe 
that it is only through constitutional change that this problem can be 
satisfactorily resolved. 
The Task Force Report suggests that in restructuring bargaining units, 
« the Canada Labour Relations Board has power to join existing units in 
one certificate, to order joint bargaining where more than two unions or 
two employers are involved, and to take other steps it considers appro-
priate to bring the légal détermination of units into Une with a natural 
détermination of the bargaining structure » 15. (Emphasis mine). 
14. Ibid, para. 755. 
15. Ibid, para. 551. 
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What does the Report mean by « natural » units ? What constitutes 
a « natural » détermination of the bargaining structure ? I submit that 
the effective bargaining or negotiating unit structure varies with time 
and circumstances, the issues involved, and the expérience and power 
position of the parties. Nowhere in its Report has the Task Force 
attempted to answer thèse questions or indicated that it has seriously 
studied the implications of its recommendation. 
The Locus of Décision Making 
Let me now turn to another important aspect of the collective bar-
gaining process, namely the locus of décision making. The Task Force 
Report rightly shows concern with problems connected with the central-
ization and decentralization of décision making. It asserts that « an im-
portant conséquence of centralization is absentée décision making.. . » 16 
This sweeping assertion is questionable, for there are many instances 
such as méat packing, and west coast longshoring in Canada where those 
who are affected by the décision take part in the decision-making process. 
In both west coast longshoring and méat packing, for example, délégations 
from the various locals involved take an active part in the centiralized 
collective bargaining process. 
The Report goes on to warn that « considérable care must be taken 
to guard against the situation in which participants to the collective bar-
gaining process are mère message bearers and position staters for persons 
removed from the places where agreements are implemented » 17. This 
warning has very serious implications. 
I submit that there are two basic issues at stake in the two quotations 
above. One is that those who take part in the collective bargaining process 
should be endowed with authority to make commitments on behalf of 
those whom they represent. The Task Force Report quite correctly re-
commends that participants in contract negotiations hâve authority to 
make thèse commitments. This means that fairly senior persons from 
management and unions should take part in the negotiating process. 
The second major issue involves a trade-off between the union's 
désire to hâve effective bargaining power and the rank-and-file demand 
16. Ibid, para. 553. 
17. Ibid 
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for effective représentation of their spécial interests. The Task Force 
Report fails to recognize the implications of thèse trade-offs and to point 
out the options available for their reconciliation. Arnold Weber 18, in an 
excellent article on the structure of collective bargaining in the United 
States, suggests a number of alternatives. First, steps may be taken to 
decentralize large negotiating units into smaller, independent units. For 
unions, this strategy generally means a sharp réduction of their bargaining 
power. Weber points out that where this development has taken place 
in the U.S., it has been a resuit of union weakness rather than a désire 
to accommodate local needs. 
Another alternative involves a change in union structure to accommo-
date the needs of particular groups. This may take the form of 
spécial groups, such as craft workers, being on the negotiating committee. 
Or it may take the form of giving veto power to such groups as has 
occurred in the auto industry. In Canada, this has been achieved in many 
cases by having différent occupational groups represented in contract 
negotiations. 
A further alternative is to strengthen bargaining procédures by having 
local union représentatives on the central negotiating committee. In this 
way unions' power and membership needs are reconciled. Another altern-
ative is to permit the considération of différent issues at différent levels 
in the bargaining structure. In the 1965 U.S. steel negotiations there 
were three-tier negotiations, differentiated between industry-wide, company, 
and plant issues. Such a procédure allows for an interplay among the 
important issues at ail levels, and for union participation at ail levels. 
Thèse alternative procédures give promise for rank and file parti-
cipation in the collective bargaining process, with the simultaneous resuit 
that local issues can be resolved and union power maintained to deal 
with major company or industry issues. 
The Negotiating Process 
Let me now turn very briefly to the negotiating process. In spite of 
the fact that there is a vast amount of literature on the interaction between 
labour and management during contract negotiations, the Task Force 
18. Arnold R. WEBER, «Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective Bargain-
ing », in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, Lloyd ULMAN, Ed., Prentice Hall, 
1967, pp. 13-36. 
42 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 25 , NO 1 
Report has failed to give any meaningful considération to this interaction 
process. For example, the « games » which labour and management play 
in negotiations were almost totally ignored in the Report. In glossing over 
thèse processes, the Task Force has failed to examine a highly significant 
issue, particularly when there is so little public understanding of the 
process. 
Personally, I feel that the analytical part of the Task Force Report 
would hâve been much better if it had discussed the negotiating process 
as thoroughly as it discussed inflation. 
The Schedule and Duration of Negotiations 
The Task Force Report notes the adverse effects of delays in the 
collective bargaining process, particularly those which occur after an 
agreement has expired 19. With the increasing complexities of the issues 
involved in collective bargaining today, I believe the recommendation that 
the parties be free to strike or lock-out at the expiration of the collective 
agreement subject to the 60 days' notice to the conciliation service, is a 
good one. Confronted with the possibility of a strike on the expiration 
of an agreement, the parties might hâve a greater incentive to work hard 
to achieve an agreement before the contract expires. This recommendation 
coupled with that which would impose a conciliation officer on the parties 
before a strike or lock-out is permitted 20, could facilitate earlier settle-
ments, particularly if the conciliation officer is backed up with good 
objective and impartial research support which could be made available 
to both parties. I will not deal further with the recommendations on 
conciliation. 
The Grievance Procédure 
The Task Force Report is quite right in pointing out that « béné-
ficiai effects might resuit from encouraging greater décision making by 
shop stewards and foremen in the grievance procédure > 21. Bénéficiai 
results might also be acheived by having on-the-spot arbitration décisions 
to accelerate the handling of grievances. Either or both of thèse procédures 
could expedite the handling of grievances and prevent them from accu-
19. Task Force Report, para. 556. 
20. Ibid, para. 570. 
21. Ibid, para. 555. 
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mulating and becoming an obstacle during the periodic contract nego-
tiating process. 
Creative Collective Bargaining 
The Task Force Report has taken cognizance of some of the new 
or « créative » developments in collective bargaining22, and recommends 
that « parties consider the wisdom of regular negotiations throughout the 
term of the collective agreement so that délibérations are not restricted 
to times when pressures for settlement and appréhension of économie 
sanctions will produce unhappy compromises and . . . the oversight of 
issues that do not hâve critical priority » 23. In this respect, the Report 
has shown a real awareness of new approaches to the « traditional » form 
of collective bargaining. 
As J.J. Healy and his associâtes hâve pointed out24, basic to the 
« new » approach is a strong commitment on the part of both parties to 
identify problems through joint research, to seek solutions as problems 
arise, to tailor plans according to the parties' own needs, to maintain 
good communications both vertically within labour and management res-
pectively and horizontally at each level of their interrelationship, and 
most importantly, to take the initiative to move into areas not considered 
part of the « traditional > collective bargaining process. According to 
Healy, the spécifie plan itself is of secondary importance — the crucial 
issue in the new approach is commitment to identify and solve mutual 
problems. The Task Force Report, by emphasizing « expérimental clauses 
applicable for a specified period, or applicable only in certain plants and 
areas », focuses more on the mechanisms rather than on the more fond-
amental principles essential to the successful achievement of « créative » 
collective bargaining. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to say that I hâve attempted — by trying 
to find my way through a maze of scattered paragraphs throughout the 
Task Force Report — to highlight thèse parts of the Report which deal 
with the collective bargaining process. 
22. lbid, paras. 298, and 401-402. 
23. Ibid, para. 562. 
24. See Creative Collective Bargaining (Meeting Today's Challenges to Labour-
Management Relations), J.J. HEALY, Ed., Prentice Hall, 1965, particularly 
pages 282-288. 
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LE PROCESSUS DES NÉGOCIATIONS COLLECTIVES 
Nous définissons « le processus de la négociation collective > comme étant les 
mécanismes à travers lesquels les parties impliquées dans le système de négociation 
collective convertissent leurs buts (inputs) en accords et en clauses de conditions 
de travail (outputs). Le système de négociation collective inclut trois champs sépa-
rés de négociations : 1) la négociation parmi les groupes et les individus au sein 
du syndicat, 2) la négociation entre les membres de la direction-employeur, pour 
en arriver à un concensus sur ce qu'elle est prêtre à offrir, et 3) la négociation entre 
le syndicat et la direction en vue de concilier leur propositions respectives. 
LA NÉGOCIATION « INTERNE ». 
Des groupes d'employés avec des objectifs différents doivent faire coincider 
leurs opinions divergentes avant et pendant les négociations. La direction doit se 
soumettre au même effort de rapprochement, qui devient plus difficile lorsque l'unité 
de négociation comprend plusieurs secteurs d'employés. 
LA NÉGOCIATION ENTRE LES SALARIÉS ET LA DIRECTION. 
Différents mécanismes assurent la conversion des objectifs ou « inputs » des 
salariés et de l'employeur en « outputs ». Ceux-ci prennent la forme a) de relations 
interpersonnelles continuelles, b) de la structure des unités de négociations et des 
sources de la prise de décision, c) du processus des négociations, d) de la procédure 
en matière de griefs, des différents comités institués etc., et e) des différentes formes 
d'intervention de tiers, gouvernemental ou autre, qui s'expriment par les notions de 
conciliation, de médiation, d'arbitrage, etc. Nous discuterons brièvement ces diffé-
rents points. 
Relations interpersonnelles. 
Nous trouvons décevant le fait que le Rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée en rela-
tions du travail ait omis de discuter du phénomène des relations interpersonnelles. 
En ne tenant pas compte de cet aspect des relations patrons-ouvriers, l'Equipe spé-
cialisée a trop insisté sur l'aliénation et la subordination de l'individu dans le monde 
du travail. 
La structure des unités des négociations. 
Le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée ne fait pas la distinction importante entre 
l'unité de négociation accréditée et l'unité négociant, puisqu'il semble s'être servi de 
l'expression « unité de négociation » pour englober ces deux réalités. Plusieurs com-
mentaires sont de mise concernant les recommandations fait par l'Équipe spécialisée 
sur la structure de négociation. 
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Les sources des prises de décisions. 
Le rapport de l'Équipe spécialisée s'est soucié des problèmes touchant la cen-
tralisation et la décentralisation des prises de décision, et effectua une mise en 
garde face à la situation où les participants à la négociation collective ne sont que 
de simples messagers des positions prises par des tiers. L'Équipe spécialisée recom-
mande que les participants à la négociation d'un contrat aient le pouvoir de décision. 
Le deuxième point important ici est le conflit qui existe entre le désir des syn-
dicats d'avoir une force de négociation importante et les exigences de chaque secteur 
local représenté d'avoir leurs intérêts propres respectés et négociés effectivement. 
Le processus des négociations. 
L'Équipe spécialisée a omis d'examiner ou de considérer l'interaction patrons-
ouvriers qui se produit durant la négociation de contrats. Nous croyons que la partie 
analytique de son Rapport eut été beaucoup meilleure si elle avait examiné ce 
processus comme elle a analysé l'inflation. 
De la durée des négociations. 
Nous sommes d'accord avec la recommandation du Rapport que les parties 
soient libres de faire la grève ou un « lock-out » une fois que la convention collective 
est expirée et que les soixante jours après l'avis au conciliateur sont écoulés. 
La procédure en matière de griefs. 
Pour accélérer la solution des griefs, un pouvoir plus grand de décision attribué 
aux chefs syndicaux locaux et aux contremaîtres, et les décisions d'arbitrage prise 
sur le champ pourraient produire des résultats bénéfiques. 
Les procédures nouvelles de négociations collectives. 
L'Équipe spécialisée reconnaît les nouveaux développements des formes de né-
gociation collective et stipule que « les parties seraient bien avisées... de négocier 
régulièrement pendant toute la durée de la convention >. Cette forme nouvelle d'ap-
proche requiert que les parties s'engagent fortement à identifier les problèmes après 
une recherche conjointe, à trouver des solutions à mesure que les problèmes sont 
soulevés, à maintenir de bonnes communications à tous les niveaux, et à prendre 
l'initiative de toucher des secteurs qui ne sont pas encore reconnus comme faisant 
partie du processus de négociation collective « traditonnelle ». Le point crucial est 
de s'engager à identifier et à résoudre les problèmes communs ou mutuels. 
